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ABSTRACT
The system of ideas developed by Engels and Marx belongs to the category of grand
sociological theory in the manner of Hegel and Comte, Gumplowicz and Weber, but differs
from them in essential elements, which are briefly summarized. Like other grand theories, it
is rich in provocative ideas, and relative methodological flexibility can be orbserved in the
attempts that Engels made to study discrete social institutions, such as the family and the
military, or the sociology of ideas. But while Engels can be credited with a wealth of thought-
provoking statements and questions in these and other areas, his work on them remained too
fragmentary to have a major impact on the development of sociology in the Western world.
SOCIOLOGY, AS IT IS understood today, originated in the grand
theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and among these the
theory developed by Engels and Marx is one of the most important. As the co-
creator of that grand theory which is usually called Marxism (his contribution
to it is often under-rated.), Engels therefore must be recognized as one of the
pioneers of modern sociology. One might argue, moreover, that a good deal
of late nineteenth-century sociological theory-names such as Gumplowicz,
Spencer, and Weber come to mind--developed in response to theories rightly
or wrongly attributed to Engels and Marx. In the writings of these and other
contributors to modern sociology, &dquo;Marxism&dquo; was often the theory to be
refuted. What Marxists like to call &dquo;bourgeois sociology&dquo; directed much of its
thrust against the system-menacing theories of Engels and Marx. That, in the
process, they may have adopted many of the positions of their antagonists is
easily overlooked.
In linking the theory developed by Marx and Engels with the grand
theorists of &dquo;bourgeois sociology&dquo; I have some of the following traits of Marx-
ism in mind. First, it seeks to comprehend any given society as a total system
in which the structures and functions of all the component elements are related
to each other and to the basic aim attributed to the whole. In this complex
totality, the social structure, or, more specifically, the social division of labor,
constitutes the basic point of reference, almost as if it were the independent
variable that ultimately explains all other features- government, religious life,
foreign policy, family and gender relations, education, art, and science.
According to Engels, the social division of labor serves as this central coeffi-
cient to which all other social life is related because productive labor is, to him,
the most essential activity for the maintenance of any social system. Through-
out his writings Engels stressed the universal interconnectedness of all societal
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institutions and practices and came up with interesting examples of such
linkages again and again. I will adduce some examples below. The link often
is provided by structured inequalities, the most basic one being inequalites in
property. But Engels stressed the need for inequalities in all social organiza-
tions. For any social action to take place, groups must organize to devise
methods for discussion, agreement, decision-making, and management.
Hierarchical organization was, for Engels, a universal given (171478)1.
Engels repeatedly stressed his claim that his and Marx’s theory was an
objective search for regularities in the structure, functioning, and inter-relations
of various social groups and institutions. In today’s parlance, objectivity
usually is defined by methodological criteria, including quantification,
verifiability of hypotheses, and replicability of experiments. Implied in this
emphasis on methodology is a suspicion of the tradition of grand theory.
Engels, however, insisted that his method was superior to rigorous empiricism.
This claim of methodological superiority is expressed in this characterization
of his method as dialectical. What this meant to him might be summarized as
follows: The dialectic is an ontology of process and change, motion being
attributed to all reality. In human affairs, change is to be explained in part by
the antagonism prevalent in all societies due to inequalities of power, status,
wealth, and other social goods. Structured inequality is assumed to be the basic
given in any social system and institutions.
Because every society is a structure of inequalities, all social systems are
assumed to be antagonistic, i.e., conflict-ridden. Were it not for the various
sub-systems, which function as system-maintenance devices, every society
would disintegrate. Yet, says Engels, the more such devices are needed, the
less effective they are likely to be (21/165). What becomes apparent here is the
emphasis which Engels, on the basis of the dialectic, gives to the limitations
inherent in human action. He defines human beings as distinguished from
other animals by their ability, through social action, to solve problems.
Human beings are problem-solving animals. They solve the principal
problem, that of securing the survival of the species in maximal comfort and
security, by an activity called production. All social systems are seen as
machineries to attain this aim, and, according to Engels, these machineries
have become increasingly more efficient. Yet none so far has been perfect; on
the contrary, every time human beings have solved some major problem they
have thereby created new ones. Every social system, while an improvement
over the preceding one, has contained inherent flaws that in the end turned
out to be lethal. Hence, Engels considered it an objective law of history that
every historical phenomenon would perish as a consequence of its own
development (20/161).
In one of his earliest works, the &dquo;Outline of a Critique of Political
Economy,&dquo; which can be regarded as one of the founding documents of
Marxism, Engels applied this generalization to contemporary liberal society by
arguing that the rules of free enterprise destroy the free-enterprise system. This
simple assertion may be considered the core assertion of Marxism; for Marx-
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ism is not only an inversion of Hegelian philosophy but, more importantly, an
inversion of liberal political economy (1/502 ff.).
All social institutions, Engels assumed, arise out of societal needs. Since
human beings are assumed to be ingenious, all institutions are assumed to
begin by effectively responding to these needs, but all end up by defeating their
initial purpose. Thus, free enterprise is an apt solution to the insoluble
dilemmas faced by the precapitalist order, but its own rules of the game also
spell its eventuall malfunctioning. What Engels suggests here is part of the
theme of alienation which, in its broadest meaning, states that, recurrently, the
creators of social institutions lose control over them and become helpless sub-
jects of their own creations, a process which also spells the loss of many
qualities-freedom, the dignity of creative work, cooperative relations with
others, etc.-that make life worth living (20/253-258).
A related image pervading Engels’s sociology is the pervasiveness of pro-
cesses of institutionalization, as expressed in the dialectic of base and
superstructure. The base that Engels has in mind is the sum-total of the pro-
ductive forces, which he assumes to be developing continually. In every epoch,
a system of societal institutions develops that is appropriate to the mode of pro-
duction. But this superstructure, once formed, strives to perpetuate itself.
Originating as a congeries of system-supporting devices, it gradually turns into
a hard crust that threatens to strangulate the system. Like the exoskeleton of
a crustacean, it must be broken and cast aside for the productive forces to go
on developing.
Engels here, in effect, asserts the futility of conservatism. Social stability,
he suggests, is a pipe dream; system-maintenance in the long run is an
impossibility. Consequently, phenomena that mainstream sociology considers
as deviations from societal norms, and hence system-threatening, are given
positive evaluation, including criminality, evangelical religions, revolutionary
movements, and revolutionary violence. The attitudes for which Engels shows
greatest contempt are meekness, servility, and the acceptance of authority.
Engels repeatedly claimed that his interpretation of the dialectic was
methodologically superior to inductive empiricism. His and Marx’s theories,
he asserted, were objective positive science. While he often made this claim in
arrogant, dogmatic fashion, he also conceded that we cannot have finite
knowledge of anything, partly because nothing is finite, change being an essen-
tial feature of reality. Hence all theories must remain open-ended, and
whoever wishes to present a social system in its completeness must intuit or
invent missing information (20/574). He even echoed Hegel in suggesting that
the total configurations of a social system become apparent only after it has
begun to disintegrate, so that all social knowledge is contingent, relative, and
transitory (20/83). These reservations notwithstanding, he took the objective
validity of his theories for granted.
If, to challenge this claim of scientific objectivity, it had been pointed out
to him that, in fact, his writings were infused with passionate subjectivity, he
would have acknowledged that cheerfully and eagerly. Several aspects of this
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subjectivity are worth touching upon briefly. I would call one of them faith,
or religion; for the firm conviction that Engels expresses throughout his
writings of the inevitable coming of a communist society without injustice or
alienation, a social order worthy of all the noblest potential in human beings,
is recognizably a secularized, anthropocentric, variant of the Calvinist faith in
which he was reared. According to this conviction, the entire cosmos exists for
the purpose of generating such ideal societies, in which matter would have
attained selfconsciousness and sovereignty. The sociology of Engels, like that
of many other grand theorists, is infused with teleology.
It need hardly be pointed out that everything he wrote is also informed by
strong value judgments. His theory of modern society was motivated by an
aesthetic and moral revulsion against the entire world of commerce and its
consequences-the inequalities of social stratification; poverty, squalor,
criminality, and prostitution; the sexual bondage of the bourgeois marriage;
liberal politics, including its injustices, its corruption, and its violence;
ideology as the reign of stupidity; and the inauthenticity of an alienated life,
with its pursuit of false needs and false values. Because he thought of himself
as a cool, objective scientist and did not wish to appear as a sentimental phrase-
maker, he often avoided expressing his revulsion directly, but the attitude
comes through nonetheless. Still, the inverted Hegelianism, which stressed
revolutionary action according to a script written by history, regardless of our
attitudes and values, a script which consciousness could only recognize but not
change-this inverted Hegelianism at times acted as an intellectual straight-
jacket.
Engels often threw caution to the wind and let his readers know very well
what character and behavior traits he liked or disliked and what kind of social
order he considered acceptable. While theory should be dispassionate in
analyzing a moribund society, he wrote in his tract against Eugen Duhring,
while moral indignation does not constitute a scientific argument, yet &dquo;the
wrath that makes the poet is entirely appropriate in depicting these ills or inde-
nouncing those... who deny or prettify them.&dquo; (20/139).
Undisguised value judgments of a moral and aesthetic kind inform not
only his analysis of capitalism, but also his entire view of human history, which
he expressly derived from that of Rousseau. Both Rousseau and Engels posited
a transformation of pre-industrial, simple, closely-knit communities into com-
plex urban societies populated by uprooted men and women alienated from
everything noble and decent in their potential. Like Toennies and Weber,
Engels was ambivalent about this trend. In some of his works he expressed
nostalgia for the idyllic life he attributed to pre-industrial people (for an exam-
ple, see 2/238-239), but just as often he would sneer at such an idealization of
primitivism as a manifestation of petty-bourgeois sentimentalism. To be sure,
primitive society as he described it afforded liberty, equality, dignity, sexual
equality, and other goods to its members, while societies based on class divi-
sions were marked by alienation, conflict, exploitation, subordination to
authority, poverty side by side with wealth, and the transformation of human
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beings into objects. Yet all this, according to Engels, was progress: &dquo;The
power of these nature-grown communities had to be broken and was broken.
But it was broken through influences which to us from the very beginning
appear as degradation, as a fall from the grace of the simple moral height of
the old kinship-based society. It is the lowest impulses-common
acquisitiveness, a brutal pleasure-seeking, filthy avarice, selfish theft of com-
munity property-which inaugurate the new, civilized class society;...&dquo;
(21/97). Yet this is progess.
His contempt for pre-industrial ways of life is seen most clearly in his treat-
ment of rural life. In his unfinished travelog of his hike from Paris to Geneva,
in 1848, he referred to the peasants he met as &dquo;barbarians in the midst of
civilization&dquo; and suggested that the deplorable limitations of village life can be
overcome only to the extent that, through commerce, contact with the city is
established (5/471, 479; 20/251-255). This contempt for the small, simple, self-
contained Rousseauian community, flourishing undisturbed by the high winds
of world politics, comes out also in his scornful analysis of the Swiss democracy
and his negative appraisal of South-West German Liberalism (4/391-398;
7/138, 202).
Engels was aware of the tension between his claim to be presenting objec-
tive science and the venting of his feelings of aesthetic and moral revulsion.
The tension resulted from the dual purpose of his work: he sought to describe
and analyse, but also to raise consciousness and promote revolution. In the
final analysis, he would have argued that in dialectic thinking objective science
and value judgments will support each other.
Let me point out in passing that, as a guide to political action, the theories
advanced by Marx and Engels have shown themselves to be unsatisfactory
because of analogous tensions between the emphasis on patterns of historic
development from which it would be foolish to deviate, on the one hand, and
the stress on human activity and indeed on freedom, on the other. As a guide
to further sociological research, which is of more immediate interest here, the
framework left by Engels has also remained ambiguous. The key terms of his
theories were never defined adequately, their meaning either assumed to be
self-evident or incapable of hard-and-fast definition, since in the dialectic all
concepts ultimately dissolve.
When Marx was about to publish volume I of Das Kapital, a work on which
he had labored for twenty years and for which, in a letter to a friend, he
claimed to have sacrificed his health, his happiness, and his family, he
explained the long gestation period of the work to Engels by stating that he
never could have been satisfied with partial results: &dquo;I cannot get myself to
send away anything before the total work is in front of me. Whatever short-
comings they may have, that is the advantage of my writings that they are an
artistic whole...&dquo; To this he added that the dialectical structure of his writing
imposed this need for completion on him. Seven months later he added the
following selfappraisal: &dquo;You understand, my dear fellow, that in a work such
as mine there must be many shortcomings in detail, but the composition, the
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coherence, is a triumph of German science,...&dquo; (Letters of Karl Marx to
Sigfried Meyer, 30 April 1867; to Friedrich Engels, 31 July 1865, and 20
February 1866).
It is tempting to reverse this evalution not only as it applies to the oeuvre
of Marx but also to that of Engels. To be sure, some basic propositions he
advanced about the structure and functioning of liberal society have become
commonplaces of contemporary social science. But his developmental scenario
has been gainsaid by the course of modern history, while anthropological work
of the current century has deeply challenged much of his historical sociology.
Much of the grand theory Engels presented has degenerated into sectarian
dogma of many contending orthodoxies, whose squabbles invite the scoffing
of nonbelievers.
But an attentive reader of Engels’s work will discover a wealth of percep-
tive sociological observations which, were they pursed systematically, would
yield a large number of hypotheses worth testing. Engels was a keen observer
of people and their relations. He read widely and voraciously in many
languages, had traveled throughout Europe, and moved easily among people
from many different classes. Ever since, at the age of 16, he had left his paren-
tal home, he had written down his observations. From early on these writings
betrayed his quick and critical perception; they show him to have had an out-
standing talent for sociology.
His own long-range ambition was to be a revolutionary leader and a
scholar, two careers that in his mind complemented each other because his
scholarship was supposed to raise the workers’ consciousness. But, while a
number of his scholarly projects fit in with this image, others seem rather
extraneous to the purposes of a would-be revolutionary leader. His projects for
a history of Ireland and a history of Germany might be considered relevant.
He himself would also have included his major preoccupation with the philoso-
phy of science; but his interest in Germanic linguistics surely had no relation
to his career as a revolutionary.
Much of his work remained fragmentary because he was diverted from it
by other tasks. Certain ideas that can be found in his correspondence or in
unpublished drafts remained undeveloped, but certain themes recur so often
that they can be grouped together into a formal contribution; and on at least
one sociological theme-the sociology of the urban slum-he produced a book-
length treatise. In this well-known book he relates the class structure and pro-
perty system of Manchester to phenomena ranging from the city layout to slum
culture, criminality, and gender relations among workers. In a pamphlet writ-
ten almost thirty years later, he came back to the sociology of the slum and
introduced such variables as landlord-tenant relations and the ecological
disasters produced by large cities. (2/passim)
The theme that goes through his entire life’s work is the sociological
approach to history; or, perhaps, one should call it a socio-anthropological
approach, because in some of his writings he paid especial attention not only
to land tenure patterns and economic activities but also to kinship ties and to
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the relationship of these to political developments (19/425-494). Throughout
his writings on revolutions, he emphasized that the outcome of revolutions
does not so much depend on the competence or incompetence of the leadership
but on the social conditions prevalent at the time. Revolutions, of course,
interested him more than any other historic processes, and much of his work
can be regarded as the comparative study of this process, with attention paid
to examples from Greek and Roman history, the victory of Christianity, the
Reformation, the French revolutions of the 18th en 19th centuries, and the
mid-19th century upheavals on the European continent. In studying any
society, he eagerly looked for symptoms of decay of the political order, political
disasters, scandals, and corruption, and the resulting loss of legitimacy.
Ultimately, of course, whether studying revolutions or calmer political
processes, Engels went back to class divisions, class interests, and class strug-
gles as the basic explanation. While his theory posits a very simple basic divi-
sion between the owners and non-owners of productive property, in the
analysis of concrete situations he made much finer distinctions. For instance,
in explaining European politics in the 1840s and 1850s, he discussed the
political roles not only of landlords, bourgeois, and proletarians, but also of
Junkers, bureaucrats, and the military, of the petty bourgeoise, the peasantry,
and the Lumpenproletariat. At times he attempted to make finer differentia-
tions even within the working class (e.g., 7/126-128) and to take account of the
political role played by formations not fitting into the division of classes, such
as nations and nationalities. Moreover, he had interesting though undeveloped
observations about different styles of bourgeois rule-British, French, Swiss,
and Prussian-scattered through his writings, indicating that he was conscious
of differences in political style and political culture even within European
capitalism. Little of this, however, went beyond occasional clever obser-
vations.
During his lifetime, the writings that earned him the highest praise among
a wide range of readers were his comments on the wars waged between 1848
and 1871. What made him famous and earned him his nickname, &dquo;General&dquo;,
was the astounding accuracy with which, despite a few major miscalculations,
he managed to predict the course of campaigns and the outcomes of battles,
and all that on information available to any newspaper reader.
Engels had been interested in the study of warfare ever since the revolution
of 1848 and his own participation in partisan warfare a year later. In time he
acquired a large reference library on military subjects, became a self-taught
specialist, and wrote about these matters extensively.
Taken together, these writings contain elements of the sociology of warfare
and the military. In various articles he presented a comparative sociology of
armies past and contemporary, explaining differences in organization and
strategy on the basis of socio-economic and cultural variables (14/5-48; 11/411-
412, 423-424). For instance, his treatment of changes in infantry tactics is
based on a persuasive combination of socio-economic, political, and
technological factors that determined the changing functions of the foot soldier
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from the 14th to the 19th century (20/597-603). These explanations by no
means rely only on class structures, although, naturally, he often did dwell on
the relationship between class structure and the character of armies. An exam-
ple would be an essay on the Prussian army (16/53 ff); another would be his
treatise on the English army, where he provided a sociological sketch of the
relationship between officers and men, relating the class background of both
to their respective manners and mores, attitudes and formal relations. The
gentlemen of the officer corps and the enlisted lumpenproletarians, he argued,
are separated by a social gulf so unbridgeable that, for this very reason, they
can establish a businesslike relationship and a reasonably decent tone of
discourse (15/605-620).
The range of themes touched upon in his writings on military affairs is
wide. There are biographical sketches of famous military leaders, written for
the New American Cyclopedia, in which he embeds their personalities and leader-
ship styles in their social, cultural, and political setting. There are studies that
link troop morale and discipline to socio-cultural determinants (15/246-254;
270-274). Throughout his attempt to link warfare to social structure, Engels
sought to reveal essential differences beneath seeming similarities. An instance
would be his comparative treatment of the relationship between infantry and
cavalry under Alexander the Great and the age of the Renaissance-this in a
lengthy encyclopedia article entitled &dquo;Infantry&dquo; written for the same New
American Cyclopedia (14/351-352). Modern warfare, as pioneered by Napoleon
I, he argued, presupposes a dense population; a civilized society; maximum
mobility; literate, intelligent soldiers; and a bourgeois state (7/477-484).
Indeed, the ultimate determinant of military potential is a country’s state of
development; modernization, he thought, would outweight such seeming
advantages as superiority in numbers and fighting spirit. The army of the
future, he thought, would be the entire nation mobilized and led by a profes-
sional officer cadre (15/534-540).
During the American Civil War, both Engels and Marx sided with the
Union; but while Marx was convinced that the capitalist North could never be
defeated by the army of a backward plantation society, Engels, observing the
amateurism and incompetence of the Northern command, had his doubts,
{15/486-495; 504-507), which caused Marx to chide him for stressing military
aspects too much. The fact is that Engels was far from being a dogmatic deter-
minist. For him the relationship between social structure and the military was
reciprocal, and in his summary of their theory he expressly stated that wars
may at certain times determine the social order (20/154-161). He further sug-
gested that the study of military affairs was a good indicator of the strengths
and weaknesses of any social system and that, therefore, one could expose the
nature of a system by studying its warfare institutions (14/340-367; 10/379).
His argument with Marx indicates the importance he attached to expertise
and professioalism. Waging war, in his opinion, was a craft or skill to be
acquired by hard professional schooling, hence amateurs and parade soldiers
would be unsuccessful in battle, and so would be those who advanced into com-
13
mand positions through patronage (15/384-388). In 1866 he compared the pro-
fessionalism of the Austrian command with the clientelism reigning in William
I’s Prussian army, where promotion to high rank was determined by, or went
to, the King’s favorites, and on this basis he predicted an Austrian victory
(16/169-173). His explanation of the defeat of Napoleon III was based on
similar arguments (17/78; 100). He seems to have thought that military skill
tended to decline with the rise in military technology and with increasing
affluence (10/543; 17/132).
In addition to professional skill, he stressed the importance of correct
organization, including a centralized command and the elimination of elite
units (10/598; 11/414-417; 16/170). If these opinions place him among the
pioneers of modern organization theory at least potentially, it should be
pointed out that he was also a Romantic humanist who was convinced that
there were character traits essential to a military commander-steadfastness
and courage, dash and daring, and a brilliant mind that could grasp an oppor-
tunity when it presented itself. Warfare to him was not only a craft but also
an art; and here too he believed that with modernization the character traits
conducive to this art tended to decline. Like Max Weber, he regretted the
replacement of grace by rationality.
Toward the end of his life, he observed the growing intensity of
nationalism, chauvinism, and militarism in Europe and predicted that the next
war would be of devastating dimensions (17/616; 21/252-256; 351; 22/45, 48,
396-399).
Another area in which Engels generated interesting ideas was the sociology
of religion. Marx, in one famous phrase, had characterized religion as a pain-
killing drug and a fantasy solution to seemingly insoluble social problems. In
a more sociological vein, Engels, who wrote about religious subjects from his
teens to the last year of his life, interpreted religions as social protest move-
ments. They arise among the poor and the oppressed, provide an organization
framework for their underground activities, and give coherence to their hopes
as well as to their hatred of the oppressors and their yearning for vengeance.
Christianity, in its original form, was one of his favorite examples of such a
protest movement. He declared it to have been &dquo;progressive&dquo; in its time and
compared it to the initial phases of the socialist movement in many of its struc-
tural details-from the radicalism of its message and the class basis of its
adherents to its proneness toward divisive sectarianism and the difficulty it
must have had in collecting dues (19/297-305; 21/9-10; 22/447-473).
He interpreted the religious heresies since the Middle Ages as manifesta-
tions of middle- and lower-class rebellion (21/304) and compared Luther,
Calvin, and other leaders of the Reformation to revolutionary leaders of the
18th and 19th centuries, adding that, regrettably but predictably (by hind-
sight), Lutheranism had turned into an ideology of legitimation for monarchic
absolutism (22/300). Anticipating Weber, he argued that Calvinist religious
doctrine had facilitated the development of capitalism (18-591) and that, in
general, Protestant attitudes had made it possible for Germany to recover from
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the ravages of the Thirty-Years’ War. The Calvinist theory of predestination,
he argued, was an eloquent reflection of the unpredictability of the market and
hence was well suited to encourage bourgeois entrepreneurship. Moreover, the
Calvinist church constitution was democratic and republican; hence, while
Lutheranism became the ethos of subjects to absolute princes, Calvinism
created a republic in the Netherlands and strong republican parties in England
and Scotland (16/247; 22/300-301). Altogether, he attributed to the Protestant
ethic a liberating effect on enterprise, politics, philosophy, and other fields
(18/594-595).
Another abiding interest of Engels was the comparative study of the
family. This interest arose from the same motives as those for religion, since
it was within his family that he had received his own strict Calvinist
upbringing, and his emancipation from religious beliefs had also implied a
break with his family. An unhappy courtship then became an additional
motive for questioning the entire institution of marriage as it was then taken
for granted.
In his first draft of the Manifesto of the Cornmunist Party, he implied that by
studying the family we can learn about the entire society because the family
is a miniature analog of the total social system (4/377). Decades later, in The
Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, he elaborated on this by sug-
gesting linkages between the gender division of labor and the development of
class differences. His views on middle-class marriage are well known: Just as
capitalism has turned human labor into a commodity, so it treats female sex-
uality and reproductive power as marketable merchandise, so that the
bourgeois marriage turns into a form of life-long prostitution. Engels wrote
about middle- and upper-class ladies with an attitude composed partly of com-
passion and partly of contempt-contempt for being no more than decorative
drawing-room dolls, compassion because Victorian social mores and the dou-
ble standard in sexual morality imprisoned them in this role. Incidentally, he
was sensitive to differences between Catholic and Protestant cultures with
respect to gender roles and family life.
Underneath his compassion and contempt for bourgeois women was a
Romantic yearning for a society in which genuine love would be the only
reason why any two people would want to live and sleep together, and in which
such cohabitation would be a purely private affair without benefit of clergy or
city hall. In the society of the future, he cheerfully predicted, all children would
be born out of wedlock.
In his comments on gender relations among the working class, he sug-
gested that such genuine love matches already prevailed to some extent,
although in the urban slum the dissolution of the family worked as a hardship,
not a blessing, if only because it led to the neglect of the children. Slum condi-
tions produce people who are incapable of developing the ability to love. In
that sense, they not only destroy conventional family life but also prevent a
more desirable form of gender relations to develop (2/369-371). Moreover,
while working class couples may be free from the constraints of bourgeois sex-
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ual morality-a freedom Engels may have over-estimated-he recognized that
this freedom was no less burdensome to women than the confines of bourgeois
marriage codes. He recognized the double or triple burden falling on pro-
letarian women and suggested that in the culture of poverty the traditional
gender roles tended to be reversed-a trend that he deplored (ibid.).
Let me turn from the influence of social environment on character to
Engels’ contribution to the sociology of knowledge and begin with his and
Marx’s views on the origins and functions of ideology. In accordance with
their grand theory, the intellectual history of the human race could be under-
stood only within the determining framework of the material conditions and
social relations within which ideas were generated. Every social system
predetermines the contents of the reigning ideas, while the state of technology
may either limit or expand the range of phenomena that can come into view.
These generalizations taken for granted, Engels suggested a variety of topics
that could be examined within the broad field of the sociology of knowledge
or ideas. One of them was the comparative study of political ideas. Key con-
cepts of social philosophy-democracy, freedom, equality, civic virtue, and the
like-are given different meanings and acquire different functions from one
social system to another. Hence, political philosophers must be understood
within the context of their own societies, and their ideas or even their
vocabulary may not be readily applicable to the present. An example that
Engels discussed at some length would be the history of the concept of
&dquo;equality&dquo; from the Greeks to the nineteenth century (20/95-100; 579-582).
He took a slightly different approach in an attempt to explain differences
in English, French, and German socialism by reference to the socio-political
conditions in which each of them arose. While the grand theory assumes that
the liberal republic is the appropriate form for bourgeois class rule, he dis-
cussed Bonapartism as a frequent variant and took into consideration the dif-
ferent political cultures, be they authoritarian or libertarian, centralized and
bureaucratic or preserving traditions of local and provincial self-government.
Above I alluded to the effect on human personalities which he attributed
to the culture of the slum. There are other examples he gave of the effect of
certain political institutions on character. For instance, in a letter to Marx (24
Oct. 1869) he suggested that colonial rule dehumanizes both those being ruled
and those who do the colonizing: &dquo;In the history of Ireland one can see what
disaster it is for a nation to have subjugated another nation. All the English
infamies have their origin in the Irish Pale.&dquo; What English rule had done to
the Irish themselves he had stated in an earlier letter to Marx (27 May 1856)
and in a published essay (16/501-502): After centuries of oppression by the
English, he wrote, the Irish are alienated from their own country, and they all,
including their aristocrats, have been reduced to a Lumpennation.
Engels here manifested an interest in political attitudes. As an advocate of
revolutionary change, he was, of course, concerned to recognize symptoms of
political alienation and mobilization and to understand the factors promoting
or undermining legitimacy. He also was interested in the reasons why a revolu-
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tionary leadership would resort to terror and answered this question by sug-
gesting that terror is the reign of people who themselves are terrified (letter to
Marx 9 September 1870). His concern with the factors promoting revolu-
tionary consciousness went beyond the tactical problem of assessing the proper
moment for concerted action. In fact, there is no indication that he believed
such fine-tuned monitoring of workers’ opinions might be possible. Instead,
his concern was with the effect of social systems on character. I have given
several examples of pertinent statements he made on this, but should perhaps
provide a more general summary: He was not content with pointing out what
slum living does to the poor or how colonial rule spoils the character of the
rulers. More generally, he thought that his work, from the late 1830s to 1895,
made clear that his hatred of capitalism was based foremost on the shaping that
liberal socio-political culture gave to the human character. In brief, what he
had in mind was the set of behavior traits and attitudes conventionally ascribed
to the bourgeois: the work ethic, frugality, rational calculation, a readiness for
bargaining and compromising, the pursuit of self-interest, and other familiar
bourgeois virtues.
His appraisal of these virtues was ambivalent. As for rational calculation,
he thought it impossible under capitalist conditions. The work ethic was an
attitude that he seems to have expected to survive and blossom forth in the
future communist society. For many other so-called bourgeois virtues he
expressed respect, especially when he compared the sophistication, honesty,
and flexibility of the English businessmen with the clumsy, petty, and
dishonest practices he attributed to their German colleagues. But, in the final
analysis, he expressed contempt for the political culture of liberalism: he con-
sidered it unheroic (22/301).
Moreover, he believed that modern development spelled the decline of the
classical bourgeois virtues altogether, for he saw capitalism itself being
transformed. His later writings contain germs of a theory of corporate
capitalism. He noted the growth of cartels, trusts, and other forms of
monopoly and oligopoly, the trend toward protectionism and other ways of
obviating the laws of the market, financial control by banks and government
interference, the managerial revolution, in which control by owners gives way
to management by a salaried business bureaucracy, and the concomitant
growth of the modern leviathan state (20/261). He also noted the increasing
frequency of scandals and corruption, and suggested that in modern capitalism
it was becoming more and more difficult to reap profits honestly (19/6-7;
17/458-459; 22/358-364). Meanwhile, as the old bourgeois virtues were being
corroded, he also thought that the English working class was losing its revolu-
tionary elan: the proletariat was being bourgeoisified (21/197).
As a scholar-or would-be scholar-Engels projected a number of works
he wished to write, his most favorite project being a philosophy of science,
which obviously was meant to be a materialist inversion of Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Mind. Given his inclination to relegate intellectual activity to
the superstructure, and indeed seeing it as the part that was most remote from
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the socio-economic base, one might have expected him to treat the develop-
ment of science as ideology and thus produce a sociology of science.
Indeed, he did point out that all theoretical models in natural science are
products of different social systems, human thought itself having a social
history. Scientific knowledge, he argued, develops in response to human
needs, and they in turn are determined or defined by social systems (20/330-
331 and passim). When he compiled historic lists of key inventions, he
obviously had in mind some eventual linking of human inventiveness and
innovation with the society in which it arose. Moreover, he asked himself why
the major scientific breakthrough which, in his opinion, ushered in the modern
age, occurred around 1450 and not, say, around 300. In response, he iden-
tified a number of social givens that favored the intellectual development
known as the Renaissance: a unified Western culture in which the learned
freely communicated in a common scholarly language, the invention of prin-
ting, medieval craftsmanship and burgher enterprise, the expansion of the
physical world through discoveries, the growth of universities, and the fall of
Constantinople (20/462-463). Similarly, he attributed the development of
science from Galileo to Newton to similar sociological determinants: the
growth of cites with their burgher culture, peasant rebellions, the rise of royal
absolutism, the Reformation, the rediscovery of Greek writings, and the great
geographic discoveries (20/464 ff.). But, curiously, he did not go beyond such
commonplace observations, and his voluminous drafts on the subject suggest
that he was not about to do so.
The explanation for this may be that, in the final analysis, he did not con-
sider scientific innovation to be part of the ideological superstructure but,
instead, regarded it as an essential element of the base. Socio-economic struc-
ture may be the framework determining the direction, the methods, and the
limitations of scientific inquiry, but the dynamics of social change, in turn, are
the results of improvements in the productive forces of society. Growth in the
productive forces serves as the ultimate independent variable in Engels’ grand
theory; and it results from human ingenuity and inventiveness, i.e., from
science.
His major work on science, therefore, would not have turned into a
sociology of science. Instead, it was meant to be a treatise on scientific method:
Engels deplored the modern insistence on empiricism and inductive reasoning.
He thought they seriously limited our ability to theorize and to understand.
It would have been a defense of dialectical reasoning (20/330-331 and passim).
It may be worth noting, in passing, that his wide acquaintance with the
scientific work of this time, together with his Romantic awareness of the
damage wrought by reckless capitalist exploitation of natural resources, made
him sensitive to ecological issues: industrial blight in big cities; the need to
recycle waste materials; the exhaustion of arable soil, to name a few. Here,
too, he might have argued that a dialectical approach, recognizing the
interdependence of all living matter and its environment, would have alerted
scientists to such issues, and he criticized Darwin, whom otherwise he greatly
admired, for failing to do so.
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I could adduce additional topics of interest to sociologists that Engels
touched upon: the political sociology of underdevelopment; occasional remarks
about the relationship between art and society; or, perhaps, wry observations
about the social psychology of radical exile communities (18/528-529). But
enough has been said to establish that, within the framework of his and Marx’s s
grand theory, he touched upon a wide variety of relevant topics, and he did
so with attention to complexities and cultural differences which suggests that
his grand theory, while serving as a broad framework, did not confine or nar-
row him. Engels may have presented some of his theories in arrogant style, but
he was far from being a dogmatist.
Not a single one of the sociological themes he touched, with the exception
of the sociology of the working class slum, turned into a major work. One can
explain this by arguing that his need to make a living to provide for himself
and the Marx family prevented him from pursuing full-time studies. Once he
had retired from business as a wealthy rentier, the demands of the socialist
movement and loyalty to Marx and his intellectual heritage further interfered
with his own scholarly projects: Volumes II and III of Das Capital had to be
put into publishable form, and the manuscripts that Marx had left for this
work were in such a deplorable state that it took Engels more than a decade
to complete this work.
One could also dismiss these excuses by arguing that they served Engels
well by enabling him to hide behind them. Lacking these excuses, why would
he not have converted his many suggestive hypotheses into major contribu-
tions ? Many other social scientists have produced volumes of monographs on
the basis of far fewer innovative ideas. There is nothing in his life or activities
suggesting that he might have been incapable of sustained scholarly work: He
was immensely well read and endowed with a mind that absorbed new infor-
mation quickly. He was meticulously systematic in his work habits and in
organizing his time. Above all, he was able to make connections between seem-
ingly unrelated phenomena.
One might argue that this broad sweep may have prevented him from con-
centrating on what Merton called middle-level generalizations; but, if nothing
else, his work on the sociology of the military gainsays that argument. In the
final analysis, it might be just as well to accept his excuses as valid.
Let me end with a brief observation about the attitude of this man to the
academic professions. Engels had received an unfinished secondary education.
When what he was learning at the Gymnasium in Elberfeld seemed to instill in
him ambitions of becoming a writer or a professional intellectual--careers that
his father considered unworthy of a solid bourgeois-his father made him leave
school and go into a business apprenticeship instead. All of his life, Engels felt
self-conscious about not having completed his secondary schooling and there-
fore not having studied at a university to obtain the coveted doctoral degree.
Despite these handicaps, he did become a professional intellectual of sorts, a
writer of scholarly books and articles, a selftaught polymath. He was proud of
this, but particularly of the fact that this made him an outsider within the
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scholarly profession. Much of his work is, indeed, that of a selfconscious out-
sider, who in his work expresses irreverence toward conventional methods and
interpretations, a scornful attitude toward the intellectual conservatism and
narrow methodological rigor of academic scholarship.
Outsiders often are the ones to challenge established verities and to make
innovative contributions. In the case of Engels this was demonstrated in a
history of the Frankish dialect that he wrote in 1882. Fascinated by dialect dif-
ferences from one village to the next in his home district, in this essay he sought
to show that the boundary between Frankish and Saxon went straight through
this very area. He had read all the relevant literature, including not only the
older classics but also the academic writings of the most recent years issuing
from the so-called Young-Germanistic school. But he went beyond this
literature and was ahead of the professional Germanists of his time in identify-
ing a special Frankish dialect and establishing the boundaries of the region in
which it has survived. Frankish had not at that time been recognized as an
independent dialect of German; today it is so recognized.
Engels later argued that the artificial and arbitrary boundaries between
High German and Low German then acknowledged had not allowed the
recognition that there might be an intermediary dialect. For him, it was an
illustration of how the dialectical approach negates hard and fast boundaries
established by meta-physical thinking (20/486). To me, the article proves the
superiority of solid factual knowledge, when supported by a flash of insight and
the outsider’s chutzpah, over the methodological orthodoxies of academic
scholarship. The Young-Germanists, whose works he had read, had developed
a linguistic theory that concentrated on phonetics to the exclusion of other
language aspects. Because he was self-taught, he knew more than the pro-
fessors about the German language; or, more precisely, he was free to make
use of knowledge that they also may have possessed but could not apply
because it did not fit into their theories. In this case, therefore, Engels demon-
strated the advantage of not having a Ph.D. and not being part of the academic
establishment.
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